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Lyric Poetry as
Society
Michael Clune
Infidel Poetics: Riddles, Nightlife,
Substance, by Daniel Tiffany.
Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 2009. Pp. 254. $66.00 cloth,
$24.00 paper.

Critics have recently renewed the
assault on the lyric, this time in
the name of restoring poetic texts
to social contexts. In the most accomplished work to emerge from
this latest assault—Virginia Jackson’s Dickinson’s Misery—the poem
is prized from its lyric isolation
and read as a communication between members of a historical
community.1 From its exile as the
overheard speech of a vaguely ideological solitude, the poem is led out
into a robust sociability. This kind
of criticism is beyond plausible; it
fairly glows with hearty good sense.
Poems do not exist in vacuums; they
exist in communities! And the idea
of community on which critics such
as Jackson rely is hardly eccentric.
We all know what a community
looks like before we ever read a lyric.
Daniel Tiffany’s Infidel Poetics
demolishes this common sense by
showing us what a community looks
like from the lyric’s perspective. For
Tiffany, this perspective is shaped
by lyric’s basic feature: obscurity.
Lyric obscurity is not obscure. The
central paradox of the lyric is that
obscurity is its most obvious feature,
its “open secret.” Obscurity is the
first thing that the student exposed
to lyric notices. This seems to supply a ready role for the professor.
He or she is the person who will
lead us from darkness to illumination; the professor will decipher the
symbol and show us the human
face, the trace of real relationship,
hidden behind the curtain of a line.
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The enigma of poetic language is of
course precisely what the new commonsense critic seeks to dispel by
placing the works in the historical
loam of letters, conversations, newspapers, advertisements, speeches,
and preaching from which they
arise. For Tiffany, by contrast, obscurity is the key to lyric’s distinctive
modes of community. He asks us to
linger with the obvious mystery of
the poem, to remain, in the phrase
from Milton that Tiffany repeatedly quotes, before the “darkness
visible” of lyric language.
Two models of community
emerge from this reading practice.
The first is a collective mode constituted by “obscurity effects . . . generated by the poetic enigma” (9). In
his exposition of this model, Tiffany
develops Georg Simmel’s and Eve
Sedgwick’s theories in order to read
examples of the lyric incorporation
of subcultural speech from early
English canting songs to contemporary rap. Simmel’s sense that secretive speech is a “communicative
event” apart from its decodable content (4) and Sedgwick’s analysis of
the way the “spectacle” of the closet
constitutes a source of social fascination (15) furnish Tiffany with a
flexible frame for showing how lyrical patois or cant draws us in. The
collectives maintained by such lyrics
“remind us of the possibility of communities that defy the seemingly
inexorable logic of transparency
and continuity implicit in the social
imaginary of the internet” (11).

As a preliminary model of the
communal being of the lyric reader,
then, Tiffany offers us the initiate whose relation with another is
routed through shared contact with
a dense sociologically subterranean
language. Infidel Poetics would
have been an important book had
it done nothing more than to trace
this figure’s surprising centrality
across literary and vernacular poetries. But the book’s true urgency
for contemporary criticism lies in
Tiffany’s exploration of the second
mode of lyric collectivity, which he
defines, somewhat forbiddingly,
at the book’s outset as “A constellation, or mass, of expressive relations between entities which are
essentially solipsistic” (9).
As we shall soon follow Tiffany’s criticism into the dark heart
of philosophical counterintuition,
it is worth stressing that his argument starts with, is founded on,
and never loses contact with obvious features of poems recognizable to any reader. He begins his
delineation of the second model of
community projected by the lyric
with a description of riddles, classic
exempla of poetic enigma. Viktor
Shklovksy’s comments on riddles
provide an instructively contrasting
preparation for Tiffany’s approach.
Shklovsky, like Tiffany, rejects the
cryptographic method of reading
riddles. When Boccaccio calls sex
“scraping out the barrel,” the point
is not to get the reader to substitute
in the correct term but instead to
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defamiliarize the image, to make
one see it anew.2 In showing how
the poem stimulates perceptual intensity, Shklovsky argues that the
riddle’s indirection has a psychological payoff.3
Tiffany, in search of ontological
rather than psychological insight,
focuses on a different, if equally
common, feature: the tendency
of the riddle, in impersonating an
object such as a cross or a sword,
to disown its speaking voice. He
shows how riddles traditionally
contain lines such as “Alefred ordered me to be made.” “Although
these objects speak and thus appear
to occupy, at a linguistic level, the
position of a subject, their grammatical position in these statements
is usually in the accusative case,
‘Godric made me,’ thereby preserving their status as objects that are
acted upon” (35). The riddle foregrounds the curious nature of the
lyric as an artifact that simultaneously manifests the expressive capacity of a subject’s speech and the
stubborn muteness of a made thing.
Readers of poetry will recognize
the ubiquity of this simultaneity,
which justifies Tiffany in taking the
formal problem of the riddle to be
a formal problem for lyric as such. I
think, for example, of Sylvia Plath’s
last poem, “Edge.” “The woman is
perfected. / Her dead // Body wears
a smile of accomplishment, . . . Her
bare // Feet seem to be saying: / We
have come so far, it is over.”4 Here
the speech that properly belongs
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to the poem is attributed to dead
feet through an as-if. This as-if, in
which subjectivity is concealed in
objecthood, is for Tiffany the substance of lyric speech.
Tiffany thus presents us with
a concrete and characteristic feature of the riddle, abundantly illustrated by examples from the
Sphinx through Dickinson. The
riddle is the ancient poetic form of
enigmatic speech. This speech declares at once the thing-like quality
of subjectivity and the subjectivity
lodged at the heart of the thing.
And now Tiffany asks: Why? Why
should the riddle’s form compress
and elide the difference between
subject and object? Why should
obscurity conceal this?
To answer this question, Tiffany
invokes the imbrication of subject
and object in Leibniz’s metaphysics.
Leibniz claims that the fundamental
components of matter are monads.
In one of the strangest turns in the
history of philosophy, Leibniz describes these atoms of the objective
world as “confused perceptions.”
Each monad “knows the infinite—
knows all—but confusedly. It is like
walking by the seashore and hearing the great noise of the sea: I hear
the particular noises of each wave, of
which the whole noise is composed,
but without distinguishing them”
(111). Tiffany finds in Leibniz’s
theory a compelling set of terms for
preserving the fascinating obscurity
of the riddle’s subject-object from
criticism’s cryptographic impulses.

162	michael clune
If the form of the riddle provides one instance of an obscure
mixture of subject and object, Tiffany argues that the swirl of confused perception also characterizes
the lyric image. The examples that
Tiffany offers us range from Virgil’s description “of an attempt to
dislodge a beehive from a tree with
a smoky torch” (49) to the “ember
of [Gerard Manley Hopkins’s] pied
beauty, too faint to illuminate anything but itself, and therefore akin
to darkness” (57).5 Capacious as Tiffany’s archive is, readers will want
to test his challenging formulations
against their own favorite lyric examples. For myself, I found his account to be an accurate explanation
of what one would have to accept
to take Keats’s negative capability
seriously. In Keats’s account of the
generation of lines such as “The
murmorous haunt of flies on summer eves,” he distinguishes between
a poetry that aims at representation
of the object’s form and a poetry
that aims at replication of the object’s substance in language.6 In the
metaphysical frame that Tiffany
sets up, the dense, quasi-objective,
confused perception embodied by
lyric language is not different in
kind from the substance of matter.
Once again, we are brought up
against the unsettling quality of poetry’s common sense. From Kant
through Heidegger, the attempt
to be adequate to obvious facts of
aesthetic phenomena has pushed
philosophy to extremes. Tiffany

adopts Leibniz’s concept of matter
as confused perception as a useful
description both of the uncanny
mixture of subject and object that
he finds in the riddle and the lyric
image and of the unusual relations
that extend from these forms.
We are now in a position to
assess these relations. Leibniz’s
“metaphysics . . . can offer critical
insights into the relational power
of hermetic forms” (9). The question of the kinds of relations proper
to poetic speech has preoccupied
aesthetics since the eighteenth century. Looking back on this history
from the mid-twentieth century,
Hans Gadamer isolates two options.
The first is allegory, in which the
poet pairs one thing with another
through an association mimetic of
the arbitrary nature of the linguistic sign. The second is symbol. According to Gadamer, the way that
the latter connects things is through
neither social convention nor an
equivalence arbitrarily chosen by
the poet. Rather, the symbol “presupposes a metaphysical connection between visible and invisible.”7
Rimbaud’s “Voyelles,” for example,
is allegory that tries to pass itself
off as symbol. Mallarme’s livre and
Virgil’s smoky torch are the genuine articles. Lacking the clear associations of allegory or convention,
the correspondences that radiate
from the symbol are indefinite.
The metaphysical turn of Infidel Poetics develops this tradition of
analyzing the lyric symbol. “Like
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monads,” Tiffany writes, poems
“are forms—centers of reflection—
which mirror all other forms” (93).
Instead of the direct connection that
the allegorical image forges with a
single other, the withdrawal of lyric
from clear limited connections is
the prerequisite for the work of unlimited mimesis. The very obscurity of the symbol is the signal of its
functioning, its confused mirroring of the sum total of reality. The
enigma of the lyric image conceals
a multiplicity of relations.
This claim will appear excessive only to readers who have not
spent much time with the modern
lyric. As Tiffany notes, Adorno,
perhaps the most rigorous analyst
of the lyric’s social dimension, himself adapted the terms of Leibniz’s
Monadology to describe lyric phenomena. But it is crucial to mark
Tiffany’s difference from Adorno
in this respect. For Adorno, the
lyric withdraws from direct relations to a space apart, from which it
reflects the social whole. The poem
becomes, in the famous phrase
from “Lyric Poetry and Society,” “a
philosophical sundial of history.”8
Adorno is thus interested in lyric
as an optic for learning about actual social relations. Tiffany, on the
other hand, is interested in poetry
as an instance of and model for new
relations.
Tiffany’s solipsistic lyric monad
does not communicate. Rather, its
entire being is flooded by a total
relationality unlimited by norm,

163

convention, or rule. His innovation is to take up an aspect of Leibniz’s thought that Adorno neglects.
Leibniz writes of a harmony that
obtains between monads, a mysterious and internal alignment that
exists without interaction. In Tiffany’s hands, this harmony makes
the lyric’s confused reflection of the
whole look less like an opportunity for knowledge and more like
a place to live. The lyric offers us an
example of a different kind of social being. Like Bersani’s “anticommunal model of connectedness,”
which Tiffany cites, Tiffany’s lyric
monadology is a powerful response
to our age’s deep dissatisfaction
with the bitter logic of recognition, with the degraded spectacle
of social communication, with the
unwholesome labor of insinuating oneself across the boundaries
of the other (13). By withdrawing
from interaction and communication, the obscure lyric finds itself
at home with the whole world.
Tiffany thus enables us to see in
Dickinson’s select lyric society a capaciousness exceeding the wildest
claims of Whitman’s rhetoric.
I want to close by suggesting that
the choice between Adorno and
Tiffany is a good way of posing the
options faced by contemporary social poetics. It is a choice between a
poetics oriented to the generation
of knowledge about actual societies
and a poetics oriented to the exploration of the virtual societies generated
by lyric. At first glance, Adorno’s
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path will probably strike most readers as more plausible, less outlandish. But this perception is superficial.
Tiffany wants to do no more than
to explain obvious features of lyric,
and he adopts Leibniz’s metaphysics
as a tool useful for this task. Tiffany
makes no claim that Leibniz is right
about the structure of reality, only
that Leibniz’s theory turns out to be
a good way of explaining certain key
features of lyric.
Adorno’s relentless translation
of lyric into social optic, on the other
hand, conceals a Hegelian social
metaphysics, one that he assumes to
be an accurate description of reality
without presenting any evidence.9
Perhaps the accumulation of a half
century of readings by his progeny
provide all the evidence we need.
How do things stand? Does anyone
today think Adorno-style social poetics have meaningfully increased
our knowledge of actual societies?
What could be more outlandish
than that?
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Theory (Minneapolis: University of
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